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dossier

ICLA-4396

Chief, RA

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/ZIPPER/CAST
UJ-PROLLOGY #300

Reference: ICLIA-4396

1. Enclosed are 21 WIE memo 5876, 6051, 6118, 6122, Q67 and Q68 giving the recent developments in subject case.

2. Memo 5876 describes UM's plans for the inclusion of V-14509 in subject case. V-14509's suggested tasks were to be the following:

a. The spotting of successors and/or sub-sources for ADLER.

b. Acquiring build-up material for ADLER's use.

c. Looking for a suitable job for ADLER. (As V-14509 would be stationed in the Munich area, the job would probably not be near Heidelberg but a solution would be for ADLER to be employed as a travelling salesman for a firm which would enable him to cover his old territory in Heidelberg and vicinity.)

UM plans to have V-14509 reporting only to him and will not divulge any information on subject case to him. On the other hand any suitable sub-sources and/or successors will be played onto ADLER so that the latter will not be aware that they are controlled by ZIPPER. The latter measure will insure ADLER's safety when the latter is face to face with KAPTEL interrogators. Such an operational scheme would be a neat trick but we are of the impression that V-14509 will become aware of exactly what kind of an operation he is involved in. In order for UM to get good results from V-14509, he will have to give him explicit instructions as to exactly what type of people he is looking for. Such prerequisites as anti-communistic, access to Allied military installations, psychologically stable, etc. can only indicate a DA operation to anyone at all familiar with "the business" and V-14509 has had past intelligence experience (see ECLA-3519). Of course, if UM had the time he could omit the requirement of access to Allied military installations and hope that by chance such a type

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would return to the West as a bona-fide anti-communist, especially after he was spotted by V-114509. However, with V-114509's capability to penetrate to East, it does not seem that there will be time for this. The members of a "Spielmaterial" unit in itself or V-114509's party would not penetrate the case itself so low, as V-114509 does not know the identity of ADLX. The above proposals of GV-L were part of a general discussion we had with V-114509, and V-114509 intended to let HQ Headquarters to take a stand on the future of the ADLX case. The plan were to get GV-L to perform all of the spotting and development controlling of ADLX sub-sources and/or sub-sources their present position unobtrusively extension of his organization into West Germany; to get HQ to agree that V-114509 should not undertake any activities involving the gathering of "Spielmaterial" for ADLX to hear HQ's reasoning on the creation of a further build-up of ADLX vs. his immediate return to Hungary. The V-114509 stand was roughly that the immediate return of ADLX to Hungary would be patent to throwing away a possible turn in the case which could develop should ADLX be able to report on any qualified sub-sources and/or successors to the V-114509. V-114509 realized that due to V-114509's experience in Germany plus his radio training that the possibility definitely exists for him to get an assignment as chief agent or radio operator for a set. Should the sub-sources consist of those which ADLX has spotted, V-114509 would have another control on the operation through GV-L. The logical extension of this possibility is to let ADLX remain in West Germany until the V-114509 reacts to his presenting several qualified sub-sources and/or successors. V-114509 agreed, however, to call in GV-L on the spotting of ADLX sub-sources and/or successors and to assign the control of any future sub-sources and/or successors to them. V-114509 will continue to run ADLX due to the feeling of initial trust which has been developed between the case officer and agent. Due to the lack of Hungarian experts in GV-L, UM will be called in as an advisor on theory problems evolving from operations which might possibly develop from ADLX sub-sources and/or successors and also will serve in a logistical support function, i.e. travel through Austria, for any such operations. Due to the immediacy of ADLX's possible return to Hungary, V-114509 felt that V-114509 should also perform the spotting function for ADLX as outlined by UM, but agreed that V-114509 would not undertake to gather any "Spielmaterial" for ADLX and that any personalities spotted by him would ultimately be controlled by GV-L. Thus, we achieved our immediate aim and gave our tacit approval to ADLX's remaining in West Germany at least until we see the V-114509 reaction after he has reported on any sub-sources and/or successors.

3. Since V-114509 presents V-114509's plan to have V-114509 present his information on Ervin FODORAIN and Joseph VITOV with a recommendation as to intelligence valueability. After clearance by Headquarters, V-114509 to pass this material on to the EATPOL and then, via external surveillance, determine if either of them were approached by the V-114509 subsequently approaching them for organization control purposes. V-114509 did not believe the confidentiality of this function but only mention that V-114509 Headquarters, in the meeting described in para 2 above, favored having the above two individuals (Fodorain and Vito) if the latter is favorable controlled by V-114509 prior to the meeting. Our recommendations are detailed summarizing of personnel in V-114509.

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b. ADLER sent his own reports to ADLIS on 10.7.53. ADLIS reported that he had posted letter reports 1/10 and 11/1 to KATPOL cover addresses in Budapest on 22.6.53 and 30.6.53 respectively. In report 1/10 ADLIS gave the latest bits of information regarding his contacts. In report 11/1 ADLIS gave a written explanation of the new P.D.O.'s and the Ludwigshafen station and requested that the KATPOL messages be sent an hour or so later during the summer months. ADLIS further reported that he had been able to receive KATPOL messages 26/53, but that he had difficulty with 27/53 and was only able to reconstruct the message having put all the clearly receivable pieces together. ADLIS further stated that he had deposited reports (material already cleared by us) in DED "Musik" on 18.6.53. From the context of 27/53 ADLIS interpreted that the KATPOL had placed station 1 in the DED; therefore visited it on 28.6.53 and found money, his birth certificate and rubber stamps, plus new instructions from the KATPOL. ADLIS also stated that he had been forced by the "Arbeitsamt" to advertise in their magazine for a job as an airplane technician, driver or office helper. ADLIS was instructed by his case officer to acknowledge the receipt of the KATPOL material found in the DED and to study his new P.D.O.s for a discussion at the next meeting (see memo 6118).

c. Memo 6122 reports on the KATPOL deposit in the DED. ADLIS found a hollow key which contained his new P.D.O.s filmed on very thin paper, two birth certificate blanks, three rubber stamps to make the birth certificate official and \$100 plus 200 Austrian schillings. The serial numbers of the 4 notes were as follows: \$10 notes, D74823820A, C97817157A, D56299039F, D51386672P; \$20 notes, D10147580A, E10827121A, A07621721A, K17976707A, H00872021A, E09618106A, M8200191A, D07702518B; \$100 notes, B10068593A, E11317965A. ADLIS received the following instructions:

a. To continue looking for a full-time job regardless of the possibility of his being employed in the German Aircraft Industry. Moreover, he was requested to continue reporting in details on his own personal situation.

b. ADLIS was encouraged towards more exact and detailed reporting. Some gross inaccuracies in his past reports were cited and he was instructed to follow up leads obtained from the "Stars and Stripes" and to use adjectives such as unconfirmed for any information about which he was "absolutely positive."

c. ADLIS was further urged to confine his reporting activities to as great an extent as possible.

d. The KATPOL also informed him that they wanted him to return to Hungary for about five days in August. They gave him detailed instructions as to how to get to the Soviet Zone of Austria with the documents available to him.

You will note that many of the P.D.O.s given ADLIS are far above his present capabilities. He would need possibly visiting but probably getting inside sources to be able to determine the organisational structure of the "Handels- und Schutz" in Hanover and of U.S. technical and communications units.

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6. Memo 617 contains ADLER's answer to our query as mentioned in para 4 of ref.

7. ADLER again met his case officer in Munich on 8.7.53. ADLER reported that he had not been able to receive the KATPOL special message announced for 2 and 3.7.53 but that he was able to receive and decode KATPOL 20/53. ADLER stated that he had sent report II/2 to a KATPOL cover address in Budapest on 6.7.53. In this report ADLER acknowledged the receipt of the material found in the SED on 28.6.53 and transmitted "Spialmaterial #3" (see memo 614-h396). ADLER also presented V-14111 with a detailed report on Leon FUCHSBAUM. V-14111 instructed ADLER to report to the KATPOL in detail on his personal situation and to list his past efforts to successfully legalize himself. Moreover, ADLER was instructed to follow up and investigate leads appearing in the "Stars and Stripes" if they pertain to the Heidelberg-Karlsruhe-Mannheim area. V-14111 also instructed ADLER to carry out only those RMs, with the time limit of 31.7.53 (see memo 6122), which could be fulfilled by external observation. ADLER declared himself ready to return to Hungary and stated that he had completed his forging of a birth certificate and would soon request a "Reisepass" (see memo 6160).

Approved by: